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Background User fees for primary care tend to suppress utilization, and many countries are
experimenting with fee removal. Studies show that additional inputs are needed
after removing fees, although well-documented experiences are lacking. This
study presents data on the effects of fee removal on facility quality and
utilization in Afghanistan, based on a pilot experiment and subsequent
nationwide ban on fees.
Methods Data on utilization and observed structural and perceived overall quality of
health care were compared from before-and-after facility assessments, patient
exit interviews and catchment area household surveys from eight facilities where
fees were removed and 14 facilities where fee levels remained constant, as part
of a larger health financing pilot study from 2005 to 2007. After a national user
fee ban was instituted in 2008, health facility administrative data were analysed
to assess subsequent changes in utilization and quality.
Results The pilot study analysis indicated that observed and perceived quality increased
across facilities but did not differ by fee removal status. Difference-in-difference
analysis showed that utilization at facilities previously charging both service and
drug fees increased by 400% more after fee removal, prompting additional inputs
from service providers, compared with facilities that previously only charged
service fees or had no change in fees (P¼ 0.001). Following the national fee ban,
visits for curative care increased significantly (P< 0.001), but institutional
deliveries did not. Services typically free before the ban—immunization and
antenatal care—had immediate increases in utilization but these were not
sustained.
Conclusion Both pilot and nationwide data indicated that curative care utilization increased
following fee removal, without differential changes in quality. Concerns raised
by non-governmental organizations, health workers and community leaders over
the effects of lost revenue and increased utilization require continued effort to
raise revenues, monitor health worker and patient perceptions, and carefully
manage health facility performance.
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KEY MESSAGES
 A health financing pilot study showed increased utilization, but little difference in quantitative measures of observed or
perceived quality of care at primary care facilities where user fees were removed.
 Following a national user fee ban for primary care services in April 2008, visits for curative care, but not necessarily for
preventive care (which were primarily free before the ban), have increased significantly, without major adverse effects on
drug stock-outs.
 Continued donor support for primary care and monitoring of quality in Afghanistan have helped to ensure a smooth
transition to free services, but additional research is warranted on mechanisms to provide discretionary income to
facilities and to closely monitor health worker and patient perceptions of quality under free services.
Introduction
A consensus has emerged that user fees are likely to suppress
utilization of care in low-income settings (Gilson 1997; Hutton
2004; Lagarde and Palmer 2008) and can contribute to
indebtedness and poverty (Russell 2004). They have seldom
produced their intended benefits in terms of quality, equity or
efficiency (Gilson et al. 2000; van der Geest et al. 2000; Sepehri
and Chernomas 2001), after becoming widespread in
sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s as a means to raise revenue,
improve the quality of services locally and increase utilization
(Akin et al. 1987; Hutton 2004). Several groups, including
researchers, donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
and politicians, have in recent years called for the carefully
planned abolition of user fees (Pearson 2004; Gilson and
McIntyre 2005; Save the Children UK 2005; CHOGM 2009).
A handful of countries have abolished user fees for health
services, and many more are actively experimenting with
exemptions for specific services, such as deliveries (Witter
2009). Since 2007, Zambia, Burundi, Niger, Liberia, Kenya,
Senegal, Lesotho, Sudan and Ghana have experimented with
removal of fees for key primary health services (Yates 2009).
Documentation of experiences from the few countries that have
abolished all fees for public sector health services, including
Uganda and South Africa, provides valuable lessons about the
effects of fee removal. In Uganda, abolition of user fees in 2001
led to an increase in curative care and smaller increases in
preventive and promotive care, and these increases were
pro-poor (Burnham et al. 2004; Nabyonga et al. 2005).
Removal of fees in Uganda was accompanied by increased
funding (US$0.02 per capita for drugs and US$0.52 per capita
overall) to compensate for the loss of user fee revenues and
increased workloads (Nabyonga-Orem et al. 2008). Early
evidence indicates that the availability of drugs did not decline
in Uganda following fee removal, and users’ perceptions
remained relatively favourable. Evidence on the effects of user
fee removal and exemptions on quality of services is limited,
although experiences in Ghana and Senegal with exemptions
for deliveries indicated that their effect on quality was
negligible, according to measured indicators of both inputs
and processes, as well as perceptions among staff and commu-
nity members (Witter 2009).
In South Africa, a study found significant increases in
curative care utilization, but not preventive or promotive care,
following removal of user fees for pregnant women and
children and subsequent complete abolition of fees at primary
health care clinics (Wilkinson et al. 2001). Critics contend that
these reforms were implemented hastily without sufficient
planning, leading to congestion in clinics and reduced consult-
ation times (Wilkinson et al. 2001). Outpatient visits in Kenya,
where fees were introduced in 1989, increased to pre-fee levels
when fees were briefly suspended in 1990, having declined
27–46% under fees (Mbugua et al. 1995; Collins et al. 1996).
Although user fee removal has led to increases in curative,
and in some cases, preventive care, health workers can be
dissatisfied with fee removal, particularly if additional facility
funds or health worker incentives are not made available
(Burnham et al. 2004; Witter et al. 2007a; Witter et al. 2007b).
Researchers have pointed to the need to maintain health
worker motivation and appropriate staffing levels following fee
removal (Campbell et al. 2009), and have advocated for
additional funding to cope with increased utilization. User fee
removal strategies need to address a number of related issues
and unintended consequences, namely to: ensure adequate
drugs are available at local levels; find mechanisms to allow
discretionary funds at local levels; conduct widespread public
information campaigns about fee removal; adequately commu-
nicate the strategy to health workers; and monitor key trends
(e.g. utilization, stock-outs, health worker and patient percep-
tions) (Gilson and McIntyre 2005; Ridde and Morestin 2011).
Still, carefully documented evidence about the effects of
removing user fees is limited, particularly concerning experi-
ences of fee removal on a large scale.
In 2005, Afghanistan implemented a health financing pilot
study to examine the effects of various community financing
approaches, including free services, on quality of services and
financial access to care. In April 2008, the Ministry of Public
Health (MoPH) of Afghanistan officially banned user fees at
the primary care level, citing the results of the health financing
pilot study. This paper draws from results of the pilot study, as
well as trends following the nationwide user fee ban in
Afghanistan, to synthesize lessons about the effects of user
fee removal on quality—both observed facility structural quality
and overall perceived quality of care—and utilization.
Background
Afghanistan is an extremely poor, post-conflict country that
developed a basic package of primary care services following the
fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. Access to primary care
services was rapidly expanded to the population, using
contracting-out of service delivery to NGOs in most provinces
(covering about 65% of all health facilities), contracting-in
mechanisms in three provinces (10% of facilities) and Ministry
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of Public Health provision without contracting in one-quarter of
the health facilities (Arur et al. 2010). By 2006, 82% of the
population lived in districts that had contracting mechanisms
in place for delivering the primary care package (Waldman et al.
2006). Donors spend between US$2 and US$5 per capita
(average US$4 per capita) to fund the basic package of health
services (BPHS), which remains almost entirely donor-financed
(Palmer et al. 2006; Loevinsohn and Sayed 2008). When
contracts began, there were no policies or guidelines on
cost-sharing at local levels, and most facilities charged some
type of fees to patients: in 2004, 70.4% of basic health centres
(BHCs), comprehensive health centres (CHCs) and district
hospital outpatient departments charged user fees, and this
increased to 84.3% by 2007 (Ministry of Public Health 2008a).
Most facilities had a fee for registration only, although some
charged for both registration and drugs.
In addition to the BPHS, which comprises about one-third of
the overall health budget, most of the Afghan health sector is
heavily dependent on donor funding (Ministry of Public Health
2009). The Ministry of Finance estimates that donor funding
comprised 56% of the 1385 budget (based on the solar calendar,
roughly equivalent to March 2005 to March 2006) and 62% of
the 1386 budget, accounting for well over half the total amount
spent on health in Afghanistan (Ministry of Public Health
2007a). The Ministry of Public Health has been slow to develop
a health financing policy, with the first draft approved only
in 2007.
To assist the fledgling government in making key health
financing policy decisions, the Ministry of Public Health
commissioned a pilot study to compare various community
financing mechanisms on their ability to: (1) raise revenues;
(2) improve quality; (3) ensure financial access to care; and
(4) enhance community ownership of health services. The pilot
study was designed with technical assistance from a third-party
research organization, implemented in summer–autumn 2005
and evaluated in spring 2007. Three interventions were piloted:
(1) a standardized user fee scheme, with separate fees for
registration and for drugs, and a fee waiver card scheme for
very poor and female-headed households; (2) a community
health fund (voluntary pre-payment scheme); and (3) free
services, which were considered an intervention as the majority
of facilities were charging fees at the time.
The pilots were implemented in 10 provinces. The managing
service provider responsible for the province-wide BPHS con-
tract (an NGO in seven provinces and the MoPH in three)
nominated five facilities (four in the case of one province) to be
eligible for participation in the pilot, based on having sound
administrative systems and full staffing. Because of concerns
about capacity to implement multiple schemes and to assure
full participation of the provider organizations, the managing
provider selected two of the three interventions to pilot. Two
facilities were randomized to one intervention; two to the other;
and the last facility served as the control. Control facilities
simply continued whichever cost-sharing arrangement was in
place at baseline, and baseline and follow-up data were
collected from all sites. The community health fund was
evaluated in autumn 2006 and subsequently discontinued due
to low enrolment and is discussed elsewhere (Rao et al. 2009);
after evaluation, the eight facilities involved were no longer part
of the pilot study. In total, 41 clinics remained in the pilot
study (21 randomized to user fees; 10 to free services; and 10 as
controls). Table 1 provides an overview of the number of pilot
facilities by province fee-status at baseline.
User fee ban
Citing the results from the health financing pilot study (which
were presented to MoPH officials, donors, NGOs and other
health sector stakeholders at several decision-making and
information-sharing meetings), the MoPH decided to officially
ban user fees at BPHS facilities in April 2008, issuing its first
official policy on cost-sharing. MoPH officials used the
policy-making process to hear additional opinions of donors,
health system experts and consultants working in Afghanistan,
as well as thoughts and concerns from various stakeholders.
NGOs working in the health sector expressed concern about
shortages of drugs and supplies, as well as decreases in their
operating budgets, as a result of increased visits and loss of user
fee revenues. Some of the NGOs at the time used fee revenues
to supplement their central operating budgets, whereas others
retained fees at facilities, where they were used locally as
discretionary income. A major concern among NGOs providing
BPHS services was a sudden increase in patient load due to
healthier patients coming to take advantage of free services and
medications, tying up the time of health workers. At the
suggestion of NGOs, the MoPH held several meetings with
donors around the time of the policy decision to see if they
would be willing to increase funding for BPHS contracts under
a user fee ban.
The top policy-making body of the MoPH banned user fees at
the primary care level, effective on 17 April 2008. From that
date, BPHS facilities were to cease charging any fees to patients.
As a result of expressed concerns, the MoPH asked the Health
Table 1 Number of health financing pilot clinics in selected provinces,
and baseline fees
Note: Diagonally-shaded cells represent eight facilities where user fees were
removed. Facilities randomized to ‘Control’ and cells shaded grey represent
the comparison group for analysis in this study. The comparison group
therefore includes facilities that experienced no change in user fee levels.
aPanjshir province implemented only user fees at three facilities.
bFacility not able to be surveyed at follow-up (one of two user fee facilities in
Farah; both free facilities and the control facility in Badghis).
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Financing Task Force to conduct a survey of NGOs to assess
their experiences with fee removal and gather suggestions for
handling the user fee ban successfully. In addition, the HMIS
and the Monitoring and Evaluation Departments were tasked
with monitoring utilization and other trends following fee
removal, to provide data to donors after 6 months to justify
increased financial support and to assess any adverse effects,
over a 3-year time period.
Methodology
This paper draws from data collected during the evaluation of
the health financing pilot schemes in 2007, detailed below, as
well as from the national routine administrative reporting
database, to examine country-wide trends in new outpatient
visits and stock-outs following the April 2008 user fee ban.
Health financing pilot data
Data for the health financing pilot evaluation come from
baseline and follow-up facility assessments, patient exit inter-
views, catchment area household surveys and the health
management information system (HMIS) database. Facility
assessments were conducted to assess structural quality of care
at pilot facilities, with data collected by trained surveyors about
cleanliness/need for repairs, facility infrastructure, drug avail-
ability and equipment functionality, among other indicators,
using visual verification techniques and interviews with health
facility staff. Insecurity precluded the follow-up assessment
from taking place at six facilities (three user fee, two free
services and one control), leaving 35 facilities surveyed at both
times, 20 of which are included in this analysis (six facilities
with fee removal and 14 with no change in fee levels). At each
surveyed facility, five exit interviews with caretakers of patients
younger than 5 years and five interviews with patients (or their
caretakers) 5 years and older were conducted using a system-
atic random sample of patients who were first observed during
their encounter with the provider. Patients were asked to rate
their level of agreement with eight statements about facility
quality, and were asked additional information about health
expenditures and travel to the facility. These assessments and
exit interviews were part of a larger annual nationwide
monitoring effort at BPHS facilities, and further details on
sampling methodology are provided elsewhere (Peters et al.
2007).
At baseline, a household survey was conducted in two
randomly selected villages with greater than 100 households
in the catchment area of each pilot facility. In each village, a
random start was selected and the nearest next-door method
was used to select 25 women aged 18 years and older with a
child aged 3 years and under for interview (Turner et al. 1996).
The survey asked about illness in the past 30 days, care-seeking
patterns, health expenditures and perceptions of the pilot
facility by asking participants to rate their level of agreement
(on a four-point scale) with eight statements about different
aspects of facility quality. At baseline, only 68.9% of households
had heard of the pilot health facility, and perceptions from only
these households were included in the analysis. The survey was
repeated at follow-up in the same villages whenever possible,
and a third village was added to free services and control
facilities to increase sample size, for a total of 75 interviews per
facility. Insecurity precluded the follow-up household survey
from taking place at six facilities (three user fee; one free
services; and two control), only one of which overlapped with
the facilities dropped from the facility assessment. Sixty-nine of
the total 107 of villages surveyed (64.5% of villages, containing
77.4% of households surveyed) were common to both time
periods. Further methodological details and results of the
health financing pilot study are provided elsewhere (Ministry of
Public Health 2008b), available at: http://www.moph.gov.af/en/
reports/Health-Financing-Pilots-Report-2008-English.pdf.
Health financing pilot data analysis
Eight of the facilities randomized to free services previously
charged user fees to patients, with two of these facilities
charging both registration and drug fees (Table 1). Analysis of
the facility assessment, patient exit interview and household
survey data compared changes in quality and utilization from
baseline to follow-up at these six facilities with complete
before-and-after data (two clinics could not be surveyed due to
insecurity at follow-up) to the group of facilities where the fee
structure did not change over the course of the pilot (n¼ 14
with complete data, as two of these facilities could not
be surveyed at follow-up). This latter group of facilities
included nine control facilities (60% of which charged fees),
two facilities randomized to free services where services
were previously free, and three facilities randomized to user
fees that previously charged for registration and for drugs.
A sensitivity analysis was conducted omitting from the com-
parison group the four facilities randomized to user fees that
previously charged both registration and medication fees.
At these facilities, although the actual fee levels for cura-
tive care did not change, preventive/promotive services
were made free under the pilot, a waiver card scheme was
implemented, and revenues were retained at the facility and
used to improve quality of care. A summary of the datasets
used in the health financing pilot evaluation is provided
in Table 2.
From the facility assessments, a structural quality index was
constructed by summing 31 binary items of observed facility
quality across the four quality domains (possible range: 0
to 31). Perceived quality was measured by summing eight
four-point Likert-scale items asking responding patients and
household members to rate their level of agreement with
statements such as, ‘The health unit is clean’ and ‘The health
workers did a good job of explaining the illness’. The eight-item
scale of key quality components, including items pertaining to
convenience of facility location, cleanliness of the facility,
respectfulness of facility staff, trust in the abilities and skills of
the health workers, quality of health workers’ illness explan-
ations, quality of health workers’ treatment explanations, ease
of obtaining prescribed medications, and satisfaction with
privacy during the visit, yielded a scale ranging from 8 to 32.
Perceived quality among patients and households in this study
therefore represents various aspects of quality of care, including
some elements of structural quality (cleanliness, ease of
obtaining medications) and some process quality measures—
both technical (trust in abilities and skills of health workers)
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and interpersonal (respectfulness of facility staff, quality of
health workers’ illness and treatment explanations, and privacy
during visit).
Significant differences in changes over time between fee
removal facilities and those where the fee structure did not
change were tested by examining the b3 coefficient in the
following difference-in-differences regression model, adjusting
for clustering at the patient and household levels using the
survey commands in Stata 10.0:1
Y ¼ b0 þ b1 Postþ b2 Feesremovedþ b3 PostFeesremovedþ "
In the difference-in-differences regression model above, b0
represents the average level of the outcome (e.g. perceived
quality) at baseline in facilities where fees did not change
during the pilot period; b1 represents the average change over
time among facilities where fees did not change; b2 represents
the average difference at baseline between facilities where fees
did not change and those where fees were later removed; and
b3 is the coefficient of interest, representing the difference in
the change over time between facilities where fees were
removed and those with no change in fees.
Data on new outpatient visits were extracted from the
HMIS database for pilot facilities, for the 1-year period prior
to pilot implementation and the 1-year period following
implementation. Data for all facilities not participating in
the pilot in a given province were added to the control
facility arm, since their cost-sharing arrangements had not
changed during the pilot period (see Table 2 for sample size).
For each facility, the average monthly number of visits was
calculated for the 1-year period prior to the pilot implementa-
tion and for the 1-year period after pilot implementation,
resulting in two data points per facility. The difference-
in-differences regression model specified above was used to
test whether the changes in visit volumes over time differed
significantly between the two groups. Due to large amounts of
missing HMIS data prior to pilot implementation for other
services, such as antenatal care, deliveries and DPT3 immun-
ization, it was not possible to analyse changes in preventive/
promotive services.
Routine administrative data analysis
Routine reporting data were also used to examine trends in
utilization and stock-outs related to the nationwide user fee
ban. HMIS data on facility utilization, including new outpatient
visits, DPT3 doses given, all facility deliveries, antenatal care
visits and drug stock-outs, were extracted for all BHCs, CHCs
and district hospitals for the 3-year period prior to the user fee
ban in April 2008, and for 14 months following the ban (total
facilities¼ 1250). Facilities that were missing data for more
than 3 months during this period (n¼ 549) were dropped from
the analysis. Most of these dropped facilities (421, or 76.7%)
were missing at least 1 year of data, as many facilities began
their operations in the middle of this period, when Afghanistan
was expanding its number of static facilities. Therefore,
potential bias from dropping these facilities from analysis is
minimal.
Service use data was seasonally de-trended by calculating the
overall mean for each facility (across all years) for each month
in the series. For each facility, the monthly mean was
subtracted from the number of visits in that month in a
given year. Therefore, the data represent monthly deviations
from the series monthly mean for each facility. An interrupted
time series regression model was used to test whether there
was a significant increase in services once they were made free,
by analysing both the increase in the month following the user
fee ban, as well as the rate of increase in visits in the 14-month
period following the ban compared with the rate in the 3-year
period before. The following regression model was used:
Yit ¼ b0 þ b1 Preslopeit þ b2 FeeBant þ b3 Postslopeit þ Eit
where Yit is the visit level at facility i at time t. b1 is the slope
coefficient for the time trend before the user fee ban at month
37 (with time points coded from 1 to 37, the intervention
month, and 37 thereafter). Feeban is coded zero for months 1
to 37 and 1 for months 38 to 51; its coefficient b2 represents the
immediate impact of the user fee ban. b3 represents the trend
in visits after the user fee ban, and the difference between b3
and b2 represents a change in the visit trend following the ban.
The Wooldridge test (Wooldridge 2002) detected serial correl-
ation among the errors, due to repeated observations from each
facility, and we therefore used a generalized estimating equa-
tions (GEE) model with a first-order autocorrelation modelling
of the error term (Diggle et al. 2002).
Approval for the pilot study was obtained from the Johns
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health’s Institutional
Review Board, as well as from the Ethical Review Board of the
Ministry of Public Health in Kabul, Afghanistan. Informed
consent was obtained from all interviewed health workers,
patients and households, primarily through verbal consent
given the low literacy of Afghanistan’s population.
Results
Facility assessments, exit interviews and
household surveys
The structural quality index of observed facility quality im-
proved from 18.5 to 28.0 (out of a possible total of 31 points)
from 2004 to 2007, reflecting the continually improving quality
at health facilities as they were being monitored. The gains
Table 2 Sample sizes for health financing pilot evaluation data sources,
by facility type
Data source No change Fees removed
Baseline Follow-up Baseline Follow-up
Facility assessments 14 14 6 6
Patient exit interviews 123 136 58 60
Household survey 479 796 198 573
HMIS data on facility visits 70a 70 8 8
Note: Only 54.2% of households in facilities where fees were subsequently
removed and 78.8% of facilities with no subsequent change in fee levels had
heard of the pilot facility at baseline and were included in the household
survey results. At follow-up, nearly all households had heard of the pilot
facility, and an additional village was added to some facilities for data
collection, significantly increasing the sample size at follow-up.
aIncludes 15 health financing pilot facilities and 55 other ‘control’ facilities in
each province where fee levels did not change over the course of the pilot
study.
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were not significantly different among the facilities where fees
were removed compared with those with no change in fees
(10.1 vs 9.2 points). Perceived quality among patients was
relatively high at baseline and increased by 1.6 points overall at
follow-up, but this did not differ by facility fee status (Table 3).
Similarly, the small change in households’ perceived quality of
care from baseline to follow-up (0.4 points overall) did not
differ by fee status of the facility.
Despite randomization of facilities to one of two selected
interventions within each province, facilities randomized to free
services had significantly lower awareness of their services
among catchment area households at baseline, and sick
household members were only half as likely to seek care
there first when ill (P¼ 0.01). These facilities experienced a
greater increase in the percentage of sick people in the
catchment area seeking care there first from baseline to
follow-up (24.2 percentage points compared with 12.1), but
this difference was not statistically significant when accounting
for clustering in the survey design (P¼ 0.20) (Table 4).
Excluding the four user fee facilities from the ‘no change’
group did not significantly change the results for any of the
outcomes. Changes in care-seeking were also not related to the
baseline levels of poverty in the districts where each pilot
facility was located (data not shown).
HMIS data for pilot facilities
Routine reporting data from the HMIS also reflected the greater
increase in care seeking at pilot facilities where fees were
removed. Visits at most facilities in Afghanistan were increasing
during the study period, as communities were becoming more
accustomed to using services and their quality was improving.
The average number of monthly visits increased by more than
1000 patients in facilities where fees were removed
(110% increase), compared with an increase of 317 visits
(37% increase) at facilities with no change in their fee levels,
P¼ 0.004 (Table 5). Facilities that previously charged both
service and medication fees showed a significantly greater
increase in visits compared with facilities that previously only
charged for services (P< 0.001) and compared with facilities
with no change in fee levels (P¼ 0.001). The two facilities
randomized to free services where both medication and service
fees were previously charged were in Farah province in western
Afghanistan. Monthly visits at these two facilities increased by
an average of 2588 visits in the year following user fee removal
compared with the year before—about five times the rate at
which visits increased in other facilities where fees were
removed (Table 5).
Trends in utilization and stock-outs following user
fee ban
Nationally, it appears that new outpatient visits, which were
rising overall before the user fee ban, increased immediately
after the user fee ban, and continued to rise (Figures 1–3). The
trend in antenatal care visits and institutional deliveries, where
user fees had not been applied at most facilities previously,
other than for drug costs for deliveries at some facilities, had an
upward trend before the ban at district hospitals, but was
flatter at CHCs and BHCs. These appeared to increase following
Table 3 Observed and perceived quality at pilot facilities, by time period and facility fee status (mean, se)
No change Fees removed
Observed
structural
quality
Patient
perceived
quality
Household
perceived
quality
Observed
structural
quality
Patient
perceived
quality
Household
perceived
quality
Baseline n¼ 14 n¼ 123 n¼ 479 n¼ 6 n¼ 58 n¼ 198
18.4 26.1 24.8 18.7 26.5 24.6
(1.7) (0.7) (0.5) (3.0) (1.6) (1.4)
Follow-up n¼ 14 n¼ 136 n¼ 796 n¼ 6 n¼ 60 n¼ 573
27.6 27.8 25.0 28.8 28.0 25.3
(1.0) (0.4) (0.3) (0.7) (1.0) (0.3)
Difference 9.2 1.8 0.2 10.1 1.4 0.7
Note: Possible range of structural quality scale: 0 to 31; possible ranges of patient and household perceived quality: 8 to 32. Changes among the facilities where
fees were removed not significantly different than those at facilities with no change in fees, for any of the indicators. Significance of changes assessed by b3 in
the linear regression: Y¼ b0þ b1 Postþ b2 Feesremovedþ b3 Post*Feesremovedþ ". Patient- and household-level models use the Taylor Linearization series
adjustments for survey data in Stata 10.0.
Sources: Facility assessments, patient exit interviews and catchment area household surveys.
Table 4 Percentage of sick household members seeking care first at
pilot facility, by facility fee status (mean, se)
No change Fees removed
Baseline n¼ 683 n¼ 388
58.4% 34.3%
(4.5%) (7.1%)
Follow-up n¼ 1090 n¼ 672
70.6% 58.5%
(3.7%) (4.1%)
Difference 12.1 24.2
Note: Facilities in the fees removed group significantly less likely to seek
care at pilot facility at baseline (P¼ 0.01). Change in the fee removal
group not significantly greater than the change in the ‘no change’ group
[Odds Ratio (OR)¼ 1.58, P¼ 0.20]. Change assessed by b3 coefficient in
logistic regression model using survey commands in Stata 10.0: Log(careseek/
1-careseek)¼ b0þ b1 Postþb2 FeesremovedþB3 Post*Feesremoved.
Source: Catchment area household surveys.
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the ban at district hospitals, but not noticeably at lower-level
facilities (Figures 4 and 5). DPT3 doses given, which fluctuated
significantly in the 14-month period before the ban, seemed to
rise after the ban, but the gains were not sustained (Figure 6).
As shown in Table 6, interrupted time series regression
models confirmed that monthly outpatient visits increased
significantly following the ban (by 149.1 visits on average at
BHCs and by 560.7 at district hospitals, P< 0.001). Although
increasing on average before the ban, monthly outpatient visits
rose even faster after the ban at BHCs and CHCs, on average by
9.2 and 13.4 more visits per month (P< 0.001), and at district
hospitals by 26.2 more visits per month, although this increase
was not statistically significant. Regression models revealed no
significant increase in deliveries following the user fee ban, and
little change in delivery trends, which had been slowly rising.
However, models indicated that deliveries increased slightly
more slowly at CHCs and district hospitals following the user
fee ban (P< 0.05 for both). Antenatal care visits increased
significantly after the user fee ban, by 5.0, 7.2 and 15.5 visits on
average, respectively, at BHCs, CHCs and district hospitals
(P< 0.001, P< 0.01 and P< 0.05, respectively). However, these
gains were not sustained and antenatal care visits decreased
significantly following the initial increase, reversing the upward
trend present before the ban (Table 6). The regression models
for DPT3 doses compared only the 14-month period prior to the
user fee ban with the 14-month period afterwards, given a huge
increase in drug stock-outs 2 years prior to the ban resulting in
dramatically reduced DPT3 doses given. DPT3 doses rose
significantly in the month following the ban, from 7.5 at
BHCs (P< 0.001) to 26.0 at district hospitals (P< 0.01), but this
increase did not appear to be sustained, as DPT3 doses trended
downward slightly at all facilities after the ban, and decreased
significantly compared with the 14-month pre-ban period at
CHCs (P< 0.01).
Similar to DPT3, the regression models for drug stock-outs
considered only the 14-month period before the user fee ban as
opposed to the full 3 years, as huge increases in stock-outs
2 years before the ban would make the pre-ban trend difficult
to tease out (Figure 7). Stock-outs were steadily declining in
the 14-month period before the user fee ban, and the decline
appeared to level off following the ban.
A Prais-Wintsen interrupted time series regression model on
the combined proportion of facilities with stock-outs at each
Figure 1 Average outpatient visits at basic health centres (BHCs)
Figure 2 Average outpatient visits at comprehensive health centres
(CHCs)
Figure 3 Average outpatient visits at district hospitals
Table 5 Average monthly outpatient visits, 1 year pre-pilot study
compared with 1 year post-pilot, by facility fee status (mean, sd)
No change Fees removed
All Service
fee only
Service &
drug fees
Pre-pilot n¼ 70 n¼ 8 n¼ 6 n¼ 2
855.9 916.5 1071.8 450.3
(41.3) (199.4) (233.6) (66.7)
Post-pilot n¼ 70 n¼ 8 n¼ 6 n¼ 2
1172.9 1922.4 1550.3 3038.7
(53.5) (348.4) (318.7) (463.6)
Difference 317.0 1006.0 478.5 2588.4
Note: Only the change in the fee removal facilities that previously charged
both service and medications fees is significantly greater than the change in
the group that had ‘no change’ in fees (P¼ 0.001), as well as compared with
the fee removal group that previously only had service fees (P< 0.001).
Source: Health management information system (HMIS) data.
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time period was run separately for BHCs, CHCs and district
hospitals, for the 14-month period prior to the user fee ban
compared with the 14-month period afterwards. Although the
models indicated that stock-outs did not increase immediately
following the ban, they provided evidence that the declining
trend in stock-outs in the 14 months before the user fee ban
was flattened following the ban, with stock-out rates holding
relatively steady rather than continuing to decline (P< 0.001
for the difference between the postslope and preslope coeffi-
cients for all facility types, data not shown).
Discussion
Experiences from countries where user fees have been removed
are increasingly relevant as more low- and middle-income
countries are considering this approach to increasing access to
health services. Evidence from the health financing pilot study
in Afghanistan indicates that there were no significant differ-
ences in changes over time in observed or perceived quality of
care between facilities where fees were removed and those
where fee structures remained constant during the pilot study.
Analysis of facility utilization data for both the health financing
pilot study and the nationwide user fee ban indicated that
utilization of curative care increased when fees are removed, a
positive finding in a country with minimal access to health
services during much of the previous two decades. Outpatient
visits represented only 0.97 contacts per inhabitant per year in
2007, one year before the ban (Loevinsohn and Sayed 2008),
and overutilization of health services is not currently an
overriding concern in Afghanistan, given the large unmet
health needs of its population (Ministry of Public Health 2008a).
Similar to what has been found in other settings, there was a
more pronounced effect on curative care use following fee
removal, in comparison with preventive and promotive service
use. One reason for the lack of increases in preventive and
promotive care utilization might be that these services were
largely free before the ban. National facility assessment data
indicated that of BPHS facilities charging fees in 2007, 99.2%
reported that Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI)
services were free, 92.6% that antenatal care was free, and
83.6% that deliveries were free of charge (although at some
facilities patients still had to pay for drugs needed during
delivery) (authors’ calculations based on Ministry of Public
Health 2007b). Even so, increased use of facilities for curative
care did not translate into increased use of preventive and
promotive services, at least in the immediate period following
fee removal, similar to findings in South Africa following fee
removal (Wilkinson et al. 2001).
Although curative care utilization during the pilot study
increased significantly more at facilities that previously charged
both service and medication fees, as opposed to those charging
only service fees, it is not possible to draw generalizable
conclusions about this effect. The NGO managing BPHS
services in Farah province responded swiftly to the initial
increases in visits at the two facilities randomized to free
services, following local radio campaigns and information
dissemination by community shuras (committees) about the
newly free services. The NGO added a second doctor to each
clinic, implemented a triage system to prioritize sicker patients,
expanded working hours and increased supplies of medicine
accordingly. In addition, they also made other improvements,
including a generator, landscaping and painting of the clinics.
The concerted efforts made to increase staffing, drugs and other
Figure 4 Average total deliveries, by facility type Figure 6 Average doses of DPT3, by facility type
Figure 5 Average number of antenatal care visits, by facility type
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resources at the two facilities previously charging medication
and service fees may have had stronger effects on utilization
than the fee removal itself. Nonetheless, the experience of fee
removal in Farah province suggests that even extremely large
increases in utilization can be handled effectively with respon-
sive monitoring and increased resource allocation, as needed.
Data from both the pilot study and the user fee ban indicated
that measures of structural quality of care were not signifi-
cantly affected by user fee removal. In addition, data from the
pilot study revealed that patients’ and households’ perceptions
of quality of care, including both structural and process quality
of care, were not negatively impacted by removal of fees. One
possible reason for this might be the relatively low amounts
contributed by user fees (on average US$103.7 per month at
BHCs and US$211.6 per month at CHCs) to the overall facility
operating budget and the limited impact these funds could
therefore potentially have on structural quality improvements
(Ministry of Public Health 2008b). The differences these funds
could make might have been palpable to health workers and
community leaders who were directly involved in spending
them, but may not have made a big enough difference on the
infrastructural quality or health workers’ behaviour to have
influenced patients and households’ perceptions of quality.
Despite the lack of evidence from patient and household
surveys that removal of fees negatively impacted perceived
quality, additional data from qualitative interviews and focus
groups conducted during the pilot evaluation indicated a
pervasive sentiment among health workers and community
leaders that free services lead to facility overcrowding, as
patients come when they are not seriously ill and waste staff
time and medicines (Ministry of Public Health 2008b).
Additional analyses of data from facility assessments and
patient–provider interactions conducted for the follow-up
survey indicated no significant differences in waiting times or
consultation times between facilities where fees were removed
and those with no change in fee levels (Ministry of Public
Health 2008b).
Another source of frustration noted in interviews of health
workers, compounding their feelings of an increased workload,
was the loss of discretionary revenues, which could no longer
be used for real-time expenses such as repairs, drug purchases
Table 6 Interrupted time series regression coefficients for outpatient department visits, deliveries and DPT3 doses
N Fee removal
coefficient (se)
Pre-slope
coefficient (se)
Post-slope
coefficient (se)
Post-pre
coefficient (se)
Outpatient visits
BHC 329 149.14*** (13.69) 6.13*** (0.42) 15.33*** (1.52) 9.21*** (1.65)
CHC 226 256.72*** (26.41) 13.12*** (0.86) 26.48*** (3.03) 13.36*** (3.32)
DH 33 560.72***(134.33) 36.14*** (3.96) 62.31*** (14.67) 26.17 (15.78)
Deliveries
BHC 296 0.41 (0.23) 0.07*** (0.01) 0.03 (0.02) 0.04 (0.03)
CHC 266 0.38 (0.47) 0.35*** (0.02) 0.18** (0.06) 0.17* (0.07)
DH 39 7.32 (4.25) 1.27*** (0.16) 0.03 (0.53) 1.31* (0.59)
Antenatal visits
BHC 320 5.02*** (1.12) 0.489*** (0.03) 0.66*** (0.12) 1.15*** (0.13)
CHC 226 7.26** (2.15) 0.706*** (0.06) 0.91*** (0.23) 1.62*** (0.24)
DH 33 15.45* (7.37) 1.71*** (0.21) 2.79*** (0.80) 4.50*** (0.86)
DPT3
BHC 377 7.50*** (1.42) 0.06 (0.13) 0.49* (0.20) 0.43 (0.31)
CHC 257 10.48*** (2.32) 0.64** (0.21) 1.70*** (0.32) 2.34*** (0.50)
DH 38 23.53** (8.06) 0.35 (0.78) 1.91 (1.18) 2.26 (1.84)
Note: Coefficients from a GEE regression with autoregressive model of first order [AR(1)] error correlation modelled on the seasonally de-trended data. Model
for DPT3 only considers 1 year and 1 month prior to intervention and 14 months post-intervention, due to drug stock-outs 2 years prior to the intervention that
severely reduced DPT3 doses given.
*P< 0.05; **P< 0.01; ***P< 0.001.
N represents the number of facilities included across the 51 time points (27 for DPT3) in the model.
BHC¼ basic health centre; CHC¼ comprehensive health centre; DH¼district hospital.
Figure 7 Proportion of facilities with any drug stock-out, by facility
type
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to prevent stock-outs and other quality improvement activities
(Ministry of Public Health 2008b). Similar perceptions were
documented among health workers following the abolition of
fees in Uganda, where staff reported that free services increased
access to health services but decreased their own morale
(Burnham et al. 2004; Nabyonga-Orem et al. 2008), and in Niger
(Ridde and Diarra 2009). It is critically important to try to find
ways to maintain discretionary income at facilities even when
services are free, as such funds can give health facilities some
degree of autonomy and can be very important for ensuring
timely upkeep and maintenance of facility quality. Data from
Farah province indicate that it is possible to maintain very
positive facility staff and community leader perceptions follow-
ing fee removal when the appropriate staffing, drugs, equip-
ment and other resources are added to cope with significantly
increased demand for services (Ministry of Public Health
2008b).
Lessons learned from the fee removal
Five of 40 NGOs contacted by the MoPH responded to questions
about their experiences after the user fee ban, reporting a range
of experiences. NGOs reported that strategies they found useful
for successfully handling the user fee ban included: enhanced
health education and awareness raising in communities about
rational drug use; stricter prescription practices and training for
pharmacists; and closer supervision of facilities and monitoring
of patient demand to ensure drug supplies, equipment and
staffing were adequate. Some NGOs indicated no effect from
the lack of revenues following the user fee ban. Others reported
using saved user fee revenues or additional budget from other
sources to compensate for increased demand and loss of fee
revenues. One NGO noted it had to cut back on activities such
as paying community health workers for priority referrals and
paying the ambulance to transport patients. A few NGOs noted
that loss of discretionary income at facilities from user fees
resulted in a lack of budget for small-scale local activities,
including purchase of additional supplies and drugs, under-
taking small repairs and maintenance, and other rehabilitation
and construction activities and running costs as needed.
Broader factors that likely contributed to the successful
removal of fees at the primary care level include consideration
of stakeholder concerns and mechanisms to monitor these,
attentiveness of the managing service providers to changes in
utilization patterns, and continued external funding for health.
Two of the three major donors funding the BPHS continued
their support at roughly the same per capita levels, and one of
the donors slightly increased its funding levels for the subse-
quent 3 years. It is clear that Afghanistan will depend on donor
assistance to fund the health sector in the short to medium
term, and perhaps longer as well. Recent research indicates that
funding for reconstruction of health systems and services of
post-conflict countries needs to be secured with longer-term
time horizons in mind, up to between 15 and 27 years for even
the best-case scenarios (Chand and Coffman 2008). Even stable
countries are increasingly recognizing the role that donor
funding can play in supporting user fee removal (CHOGM
2009), and donors have expressed willingness to do this
(International Health Partnership 2009). The experience of the
NGO in Farah in very successfully coping with large increases
in demand following fee removal, by adding staff, drugs and
equipment directly, speaks to the importance of being ready
with additional preparations and resources when fees are
removed. It is important to think about potential additional
investments that may be necessary, aside from money for
drugs, equipment and other items. Investment in human
resource capacity, for example through training additional
health workers to staff facilities where visits increase substan-
tially, is an important consideration for fee removal and one
that requires a longer-term planning horizon and close
co-ordination with human resources departments (Campbell
et al. 2009).
Limitations of data sources
Data used in the analyses presented in this paper have several
notable limitations. First, the number of facilities included in
the health financing pilot study was small, limited primarily
due to practical considerations but further reduced by insecurity
at follow-up. This, combined, with the higher-than-anticipated
design effect of some of the indicators measured meant that the
power to detect differences between facility groups was
relatively low. Although observed and perceived quality
showed no discernable trends, the large increase in care seeking
at facilities randomized to free services was not statistically
greater than the increase among facilities with no fee change.
Second, the routine HMIS data used to assess changes in
utilization during the pilot study and following the user fee ban
were incomplete, and analysis was limited to facilities missing
no more than 3 months of data. Routine reporting systems in
many developing countries, such as Afghanistan, suffer from
questionable data accuracy, although they can still be useful for
detecting trends over time.
Conclusions and policy implications
The Afghanistan health financing pilot study and subsequent
nationwide user fee ban at the primary care level represent the
successful application of a pilot study to make an informed
national policy decision. The user fee ban was implemented
swiftly after presentation of the pilot study results, but
following deliberations and further information gathering
about best practices in user fee removal and discussion of
health sector stakeholder concerns. Early results indicate that
visits for curative care, but not necessarily for preventive and
promotive care, have increased following the ban, without
major adverse effects on drug stock-outs.
There is a need for continued monitoring following the user
fee ban, a best practice recommended by user fee experts
(Gilson and McIntyre 2005; Ridde and Morestin 2011). For
example, some concerns about quality did not emerge in
Uganda until 2 to 3 years after user fees were abolished
(Nabyonga-Orem et al. 2008). Afghanistan has taken the
positive decision to use a 3-year time-frame to monitor the
effects of the user fee ban. During this period, in addition to
continued analysis of routine reporting data, further research
should be conducted on mechanisms to provide discretionary
income to facilities, and on health worker and patient percep-
tions, in order to better understand the longer-term effects of
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increased service utilization on health worker morale and
consumer perceptions of free government services.
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Endnote
1 The binary outcome of seeking care first at the pilot facility was
tested using the logistic regression model: Log[P(careseek)/
(1-P(careseek))]¼b0þ b1 Postþb2 Feesremovedþ b3 Post*Fees-
removed.
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